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Abstract
This article hypothesized that the possibility to construct intellectual meaning 
of a terrorist attack (i.e., whether participants can cognitively understand 
why the perpetrators did their crime) reduces the negative psychological 
consequences typically associated with increased terrorist threat. Concretely, 
the authors investigated the effect of intellectual meaning (induced by 
providing additional information about potential economic, cultural, and 
historical reasons for the terrorist attack) on perceived terrorist threat and 
associated emotional well-being. Study 1 revealed that pictures of terrorist 
attacks elicited less experienced terrorist threat when they were presented 
with background information about the terrorists’ motives (meaning 
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provided) rather than without additional background information (no meaning 
provided). Study 2 replicated this effect with a different manipulation 
of terrorist threat (i.e., newspaper article) and clarified the underlying 
psychological process: Participants in the high terror salience condition with 
meaning provided experienced less terrorist threat and thus more emotional 
well-being in the face of crisis than participants in the high terror salience 
condition without meaning provided. Theoretical and practical implications 
in the context of psychological health and mass media effects are discussed.
Keywords
community violence, spirituality and violence, war
Greater is our terror of the unknown.
Titus Livius, Roman author and historian, 59 b.c.-a.d. 17
Since a series of devastating terrorist attacks (e.g., the attacks on the World 
Trade Center on September 11, 2001; the Madrid train bombings in March, 
2004; or the 7/7 bombings in London, 2005), international fundamentalist 
terrorism emerged as one of the most highly recognized security threats in 
the Western world. Although it is highly unlikely for the individual to become 
a victim of terrorism (because of extremely low base rates), most of us feel 
elevated levels of terrorist threat whenever we are reminded about terrorism 
and associated potential threat (e.g., by newspaper articles, pictures of 
attacks, or political discussion about counterterrorist measures; see Fischer, 
Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Frey, & Osswald, 2007).1
Previous research has shown that subjectively perceived terrorist threat 
affects a broad variety of personal and collective psychological variables, 
including reduced emotional well-being (Fischer, Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, 
Jonas, & Frey, 2006; Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003), elevated 
levels of posttraumatic stress (PTS; Silver, Holman, McIntosh, Poulin, & 
Gil-Rivas, 2002), or symptoms of depression (Schuster et al., 2001; for an 
overview, see also Fischer & Ai, 2008). On a collective level, terrorist threat 
leads to reduced consumer spending, change of political opinions toward 
more conservatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), and crisis in 
financial markets (e.g., Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). Most 
tragically, Gigerenzer (2004) even found that after the 9/11 attacks, fatal car 
accidents significantly increased because people avoided travelling by 
airplane.
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Altogether, terrorism research shows that increased levels of perceived ter-
rorist threat can have dramatic effects on personal and collective psychologi-
cal responses (Fischer & Ai, 2008; Fischer et al., 2007). Hence, it is important 
to detect ways to reduce subjectively experienced terrorist threat and its neg-
ative psychological consequences. The present research investigates whether 
the detrimental impact of terrorism on subjectively experienced terrorist threat 
and associated emotional well-being depends on whether individuals can 
intellectually make sense (intellectual meaning) of the terrorists’ crime. In 
other words, does additional information provided about why the terrorists 
committed their crime (e.g., historical, economic, or cultural reasons) buffer 
the negative psychological consequences of terrorist threat?
Meaning and Coping With Terrorist Threat
Research on meaning consistently revealed that the ability to make sense of 
negative experiences helps to cope with adversity (Frankl, 1963; McIntosh, 
Silver, & Wortman, 1993; Updegraff, Silver, & Holman, 2008). This positive 
coping effect of meaning has been found for a broad variety of extreme 
adversities, such as coping with the horrifying experiences as a prisoner in a 
Nazi concentration camp (Frankl, 1963), loss of family members (Davis, 
Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998), loss of a child by the sudden infant death 
syndrome (McIntosh et al., 1993), severe injuries (Bulman & Wortman, 
1977), experiences of violence (Currier, Holland, & Neimeyer, 2006), and 
terrorism (Updegraff et al., 2008). The positive effects of meaning on coping 
with adversity have been mainly explained by two processes: (a) meaning 
provides people with an increased sense of control and security (Heider, 
1958; Kelley, 1967), which makes the world more predictable (Roese & 
Olson, 1996), and (b) meaning attenuates the emotional intensity of unex-
pected events (Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, & Gilbert, 2005; Wilson, Gilbert, & 
Centerbar, 2003; for an overview, see also Updegraff et al., 2008).
Most studies on meaning and coping have been conducted in context of 
personal trauma such as bereavement and illness. In contrast, research on 
meaning and coping with “symbolic threats” (Updegraff et al., 2008, p. 710), 
such as terrorism with its broad negative personal and collective implica-
tions, is in its infancy (for an exception, see Updegraff et al., 2008, who 
found in a longitudinal study that finding meaning in terrorism is associated 
with reduced levels of PTS symptoms). Especially, great issues of causality 
exist, as most previous studies have been conducted on a correlational basis 
(e.g., by using cross-sectional or longitudinal designs; see Updegraff et al., 
2008). To address this issue, the present research experimentally (causally) 
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investigates the impact of intellectual meaning (i.e., whether participants can 
understand the reasons for a terrorist attack) on subjectively experienced ter-
rorist threat and emotional well-being.
The Present Research
We investigated whether providing a rationale for a terrorist attack (which 
enables individuals to construct intellectual meaning of this kind of collective 
threat) reduces its potential negative impact on subjectively perceived terrorist 
threat and emotional well-being (which is strongly tied to mental health-
related impacts of terrorist threat; Fischer & Ai, 2008; Fischer et al., 2006). 
This is a new type of research question as most previous studies on meaning 
and coping with adversity addressed personal meaning, reflecting more on the 
growth and personal benefit aspects of coping processes (cf. Updegraff et al., 
2008). In contrast, the present research addresses coping processes associated 
with a collective threat such as terrorism. In addition, previous research has 
been mainly conducted on a correlational basis, which makes it impossible to 
definitely determine cause and effect. The present research addresses these 
issues.
In the following studies, collective terrorist threat was induced either by 
pictures or newspaper articles of terrorist attacks. In addition, we manipulated 
whether participants received background information about the terrorists’ 
motives and reasons (rationale for the attack provided) or not (rationale for the 
attack not provided). We expected that providing a rationale for the attack 
helps individuals to construct intellectual meaning of the terrorist attacks, 
which in turn reduces their subjectively experienced terrorist threat as well as 
the negative effect of terrorism on emotional well-being. Two studies tested 
these hypotheses.
Study 1
The first study was designed to test whether there is first evidence that pro-
viding a rationale for a terrorist attack (i.e., providing meaning by information 
about the motives of the terrorists) alleviates the negative impact of terror 
salience on perceived terrorist threat and emotional well-being.
Method
Participants and design. Sixty students from the University of Exeter
(30 women and 30 men; ages ranging from 18 to 49; M = 25.67, SD = 8.55) 
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participated in this study.2 The experimental procedure was approved by 
the ethics committee of the University of Exeter. The study consisted of a 
one-factorial design with three between-participant conditions (high terror 
salience with rationale for the attack vs. high terror salience without rationale 
for the attack vs. nonterror salience). Participants were randomly assigned to 
the experimental conditions.
Material and procedure. Participants were approached on the University 
campus and asked whether they would be willing to participate in a study on 
terrorism. Participants were asked not to participate in the study if they or fam-
ily members previously became personally involved in terrorist attacks. First, 
participants were either exposed to pictures of the 7/7 London Bombings in 
July, 2005 (high terror salience condition without rationale for the attack) or 
nonterror related pictures (nonterror salience). In a third condition, participants 
were exposed to the same pictures of the London Bombings mentioned above, 
but additionally received a short paragraph that explained potential motives of 
the perpetrators (e.g., social, economic, and cultural marginalization of Islamic 
countries by Western society) of the London Bombings (high terror salience 
condition with rationale for the attack).3
After the manipulation of the independent variable, participants answered 
on three items to what extent they feel personally threatened by terrorism 
(i.e., perceived terrorist threat). The following items were used on a scale 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely): “To what extent do you feel personally 
threatened by terrorism?” “To what extent do you feel your loved ones are 
personally threatened by terrorism?” and “How likely do you think it is that 
you will be involved in a terrorist attack?” Because these items highly cor-
related (rs ranging between .37 .and 71, all ps < .01), they were collapsed to 
a scale of “perceived terrorist threat” (a = .79). Afterwards, participants 
reported their currently experienced positive and negative emotions on the 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) as well as for explorative reasons control items on general mental 
health. Finally, participants were thoroughly debriefed, and it was assured by 
a personal talk that no one left with negative emotions.4
Results and Discussion
Check for interfering effects. Participants’ age or gender did not significantly 
interact with the experimental conditions, all Fs < 1.
Perceived terrorist threat. For an overview, see Table 1. The overall ANOVA 
received marginal significance, F(2, 57) = 2.86, p = .065, h2 = .09. Post hoc 
tests (least significant difference) revealed that participants in the high terror 
 at LMU Muenchen on June 13, 2013jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Fischer et al. 1437
salience/high-meaning condition (M = 1.68, SD = 0.67) reported lower levels 
of perceived terrorist threat than participants in the high terror salience/
low-meaning condition (M = 2.20, SD = 0.87; p = .04). Moreover, partici-
pants in the high terror salience/high-meaning condition did not feel signifi-
cantly more threatened by terrorism than participants in the nonterror salience 
control condition (M = 1.69, SD = 0.80; p = .97). However, participants in the 
high terror salience/low-meaning condition felt significantly more threatened 
than participants in the control condition (p = .04).
Emotional well-being. Two participants did not complete the emotions mea-
sure, leaving only 58 participants for the following analyses. Preliminary 
analyses revealed no significant overall effect for the difference value 
between positive and negative emotions, F < 1.56, which might be due to the 
fact that there was no significant effect for positive emotions, F < 1. How-
ever, there were interesting findings for negative emotions, which are reported 
below. The overall ANOVA for negative emotions was significant, 
F(2, 55) = 5.27, p = .008, h2 = .16. Post hoc tests (least significant differ-
ence) revealed that participants in the high terror salience/low-meaning con-
dition (M = 2.01, SD = 0.83) reported higher levels of negative emotions than 
participants in the control group (M = 1.41, SD = 0.35; p = .002). However, 
this comparison with the control group was considerably attenuated (but still 
significant) for the high terror salience/high-meaning condition (M = 1.77, 
SD = 0.46; p = .049). No further significant effects occurred. Although nega-
tive emotions and perceived terrorist threat significantly correlated (r = .44, 
p = .001), no significant mediation was found for the effect of meaning on 
negative emotions via perceived terrorist threat.
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Perceived Terrorist 
Threat, Negative Emotions, Positive Emotions, and Emotional Well-Being (i.e., 
Difference of Positive Minus Negative Emotions) as a Function of Experimental 
Condition in Study 1
 Dependent Measures
 Perceived Negative Positive Emotional 
Experimental Condition Terrorist Threat Emotions Emotions Well-Being
Low terror salience 1.69 (0.80) 1.41 (0.35) 2.21 (0.88) 0.80 (0.80)
High terror salience with 1.68 (0.67) 1.77 (0.46) 2.22 (0.52) 0.45 (0.72) 
meaning
High terror salience without 2.20 (0.87) 2.06 (0.81) 2.31 (0.65) 0.30 (1.16) 
meaning
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Study 1 provided first evidence that the level of subjectively experienced 
terrorist threat depends on whether participants can understand why the ter-
rorists committed their crime. When a rationale for the terrorist attack (i.e., 
background information about the motives of the terrorists, which helps to 
construct intellectual meaning) was provided, participants felt less threat-
ened by terrorism than when no rationale was provided. A similar effect was 
found for experienced negative emotions. A limitation of Study 1 was that 
we did not find any effects of meaning on positive emotions and that 
we found no significant difference in experienced negative emotions 
between the high terror salience/high-meaning and the high terror salience/
low-meaning condition.
Study 2
The aims of Study 2 were (a) to replicate the findings of Study 1 with a more 
subtle verbal manipulation of terrorist threat (i.e., newspaper articles about 
terrorism) and (b) to shed light on the underlying psychological processes 
related to the interplay between terror salience, meaning, perceived terrorist 
threat, and emotional well-being.
Method
Participants and design. Sixty students from the University of Exeter (30 
women and 30 men; ages ranging from 17 to 82; M = 26.85, SD = 14.81) 
participated in this study.5 The experimental procedure was approved by the 
ethics committee of the University of Exeter. The study consisted of a one-
factorial design with three between-participant conditions (high terror 
salience with rationale for the attack vs. high terror salience without rationale 
for the attack vs. nonterror salience). Participants were randomly assigned to 
the experimental conditions.
Material and procedure. Participants were recruited using the same proce-
dure as in Study 1. First, participants in the high terror salience condition read 
a short newspaper article about the 7/7 terrorist attacks carried out in London, 
July, 2005.6 Participants in the high terror salience condition with rationale for 
the attack received the same extra background information for the motives 
of the perpetrators as used in Study 1; participants in the high terror salience 
condition without rationale for the attack did not receive such extra back-
ground information about the terrorists’ motive. Participants in the nonterror 
salience control condition read a short newspaper article about the daily life in 
Exeter, United Kingdom.
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Afterwards, to measure perceived personal and collective threat, partici-
pants were asked the following items on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(extremely): (a) “Terrorism is a great concern for the British government” 
(collective threat) and (b) “How likely do you think it is that you will be 
involved in a terrorist attack?” (personal threat). On a theoretical basis, both 
items were averaged to a scale of “perceived terrorist threat” (both items did 
not significantly correlate, which is consistent to the perspective that collec-
tive threat and personal threat are two distinct facets of terrorist threat, which 
at the end, however, belong together to one overall experience of terrorist 
threat). Next, we measured positive and negative emotions by the PANAS 
(Watson et al., 1988). Afterwards, for explorative reasons, participants 
answered control items on their general mental health (no significant find-
ings were found for these items). Finally, the debriefing procedure was the 
same as in Study 1.
Results and Discussion
Check for interfering effects. Participants’ sex or age was not significantly 
associated with the dependent variables nor interacted with the experimental 
conditions, all Fs < 1.74, all ps > .18.
Perceived terrorist threat. For an overview, see Table 2. An overall ANOVA 
was significant, F(2, 57) = 3.53, p = .04, h2 = .11. Post hoc tests (least signifi-
cant difference) revealed that participants in the high terror salience/high-
meaning condition (M = 2.75, SD = 0.79) reported lower levels of perceived 
terrorist threat than participants in the high terror salience/low-meaning con-
dition (M = 3.25, SD = 0.55; p = .01). No further significant effects occurred.
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Perceived Terrorist 
Threat, Negative Emotions, Positive Emotions, and Emotional Well-Being (i.e., 
Difference of Positive Minus Negative Emotions) as a Function of Experimental 
Condition in Study 2
 Dependent Measures
 Perceived Negative Positive Emotional 
Experimental Condition Terrorist Threat Emotions Emotions Well-Being
Low terror salience 3.03 (0.38) 1.42 (0.31) 2.17 (0.69) 0.74 (0.71)
High terror salience with 2.75 (0.79) 1.78 (0.59) 2.56 (1.00) 0.78 (1.01) 
meaning
High terror salience 3.25 (0.55) 1.79 (0.58) 2.05 (0.50) 0.26 (0.56) 
without meaning
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Emotional well-being. To enable later mediation tests, as an indicator of emo-
tional well-being we computed the difference value between reported positive 
minus negative emotions. The overall ANOVA was marginally significant, 
F(2, 57) = 2.69, p = .076, h2 = .09. Post hoc tests (least significant difference) 
revealed that participants in the high terror salience/high-meaning condition 
(M = 0.78, SD = 1.01) reported higher levels of emotional well-being than 
those in the high terror salience/low-meaning condition (M = 0.26, SD = 0.56; 
p = .04). No difference in emotional well-being occurred between participants 
in the high terror salience/high-meaning condition and the nonterror salience 
control condition (M = 0.74, SD = 0.71; p = .89), whereas participants in the 
high terror salience/low-meaning condition reported marginal significantly 
lower levels of emotional well-being (p = .058).
Mediational analyses. In the following, we tested whether differences in the 
level of perceived terrorist threat mediate the effect of our meaning manipula-
tion (high vs. low meaning) on emotional well-being. To test this potential 
mediation effect, a bootstrapping analysis based on 1,000 bootstraps was run 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Results showed a significant direct effect of mean-
ing on emotional well-being, t = –1.99, p = .05, which was reduced to non-
significance, p = .22, when controlling for the possible mediator perceived 
terrorist threat, which then was still marginally significant, p = .058. How-
ever, the indirect effect only approached significance (Lower Limit  95% CI = 
–0.54; Upper Limit 95% CI = 0.07; p > .05). Hence, perceived terrorist threat 
only partially mediated the effect of meaning on emotional well-being.
General Discussion
Two studies investigated the effect of the possibility to construct intellectual 
meaning on perceived terrorist threat and its effects on associated emotional 
well-being. Study 1 revealed that pictures of terrorist attacks elicited less sub-
jective threat and less emotional well-being when they were presented with, 
rather than without, background information about the terrorists’ potential 
economic, historical, and social motives. Study 2 replicated this effect with an 
alternative manipulation of terror salience (i.e., newspaper article about a 
terrorist attack). It also could be shown that the effect of terror salience on 
emotional well-being was partially mediated by different levels of perceived 
terrorist threat.
Implications and Limitations
Our findings have important theoretical and practical implications. First of 
all, from a theoretical perspective, the present studies are the first ones that 
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causally showed the stress-buffering effect of intellectual meaning on 
perceived threat. Previous studies mostly investigated this phenomenon on a 
correlational basis in the clinical context. So far, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no research did directly manipulate meaning in the context of terrorist 
threat. On the basis of the present results, we can say that the possibility to 
construct intellectual meaning for an adverse event causally reduces its nega-
tive psychological impact.
Moreover, our series of studies is the first showing the stress-buffering 
effect of intellectual meaning. Most previous studies addressed the positive 
impact of personal meaning (i.e., the personal growth and benefit aspects) of 
coping with threat and trauma (Updegraff et al., 2008). The present studies 
took a new approach and showed that positive effects of meaning can also be 
found when meaning is provided on a rather intellectual basis (i.e., providing 
motives and a rationale for a terrorist attack). However, a limitation of the 
present set of studies is that we did not measure to what extent participants 
really constructed meaning of the described terrorist attacks. Future research 
should address this point and employ measures of intellectual meaning 
construction.
Another limitation of the present research is that the effect of meaning on 
emotional well-being was mainly driven by negative emotions in Study 1, 
whereas it was mainly driven by positive emotions in Study 2. A reason for 
that finding might be that terror salience was induced by different stimuli 
across both studies. In Study 1, we used pictures and in Study 2 fictive news-
paper articles. Previous research has shown that pictures of terrorist attacks 
lead to more pronounced negative psychological reactions than newspaper 
articles about the same attack (see Fischer et al., 2007). Accordingly, our 
visual manipulation of terrorist threat might have been more strongly associ-
ated with negative emotional responses than the text manipulation of terrorist 
threat. It would be a fruitful endeavor for future research to distinguish 
between cognitive and affective reactions (including potential emotional dis-
tinction processes) to terrorist threat as a function of different emotional 
qualities of different terror salience manipulations.7
Another limitation of the previous studies is that we did not measure our 
dependent variables before we manipulated the independent variables. Thus, 
we cannot indicate the effect sizes for actual changes in these dimensions as 
a function of our experimental manipulation. Future research should take that 
into account.
From a practical perspective, the present findings suggest that mental 
health practitioners should consider the construction of meaning as a possible 
way to buffer against the traumatizing effects of large-scaled social threats 
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like terrorism. Finally, the present research also has important implications for 
media psychology. We showed that the frightening effect of terrorist threat 
can be altered by the way media reports about terrorism. Media reports that 
are rather one sided and thus do not mention the potential motives of the per-
petrators are rather counterproductive in calming down the public. Focusing 
on both, the victims’ pain as well as the potential reasons of the perpetrators 
might be a better way in limiting the undoubtedly negative psychological con-
sequences of terrorist threat.
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Notes
1. This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, 
commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
2. This study was conducted in context of a 3rd-year project at the University of 
Exeter, United Kingdom.
3. The original formulation of the meaning manipulation can be requested by the first 
author.
4. In a pilot study, we tested whether background information about terrorists’ poten-
tial motives indeed enables participants to construct increased levels of meaning 
(i.e., ability to make sense of the attack) with regard to the terrorist attack. We sep-
arated the manipulation check from the main studies to prevent potential demand 
effects. Method: Seventy-three students from the University of Graz (55 women 
and 18 men; ages ranging from 18 to 43; M = 25.67, SD = 22.96) participated in this 
study in context of a social psychology lecture. The study consisted of a one-
factorial design with three between-participant conditions (high terror salience with 
rationale for the attack vs. high terror salience without rationale for the attack vs. 
nonterror salience control group). Participants were randomly assigned to the 
experimental conditions. First of all, participants were either exposed to a picture of 
the 7/7 London Bombings in July, 2005 (i.e., bus without roof; high terror salience 
condition without rationale for the attack) or nonterror related pictures (i.e., pic-
ture of a football game; nonterror salience). In a third condition, participants were 
exposed to the same pictures of the London Bombings mentioned above, but 
additionally received a short paragraph that explained potential motives of 
 at LMU Muenchen on June 13, 2013jiv.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
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the perpetrators (e.g., social, economic, and cultural marginalization of Islamic 
countries by Western society) of the London Bombings (high terror salience condi-
tion with rationale for the attack). Afterwards, participants indicated to what extent 
they can understand why the terrorists conducted the attack on the following items 
on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much): “I can understand why the terrorists 
conducted this attack,” “The attacks make sense for me,” and “I can understand the 
reasons why the terrorists committed this terrorist attack” (a = .72). Afterwards, 
participants were debriefed. Results on Meaning: The overall ANOVA was sig-
nificant, F(2, 57) = 5.81, p = .005, h2 = .14. Post hoc tests (least significant differ-
ence) revealed that participants in the high terror salience/high-meaning condition 
(M = 2.65, SD = 0.97) reported more understanding for the attacks than those in the 
high terror salience condition without meaning manipulation (M = 1.79, SD = 1.19; 
p = .006) and the low terror salience control group (M = 1.69, SD = 1.05; p = .003). 
To conclude, our manipulation of meaning in context of terrorism is successful and 
can be used in the following study as a valid manipulation of meaning of terrorism.
5. This study was conducted in context of a 3rd-year project at the University of 
Exeter, United Kingdom.
6. The text of the newspaper article was the following: “Four suicide bombers struck 
in central London on Thursday 7 July, killing 52 people and injuring more than 
770. The coordinated attacks hit the transport system as the morning rush hour 
drew to a close. Three bombs went off at or around 0850 BST on underground 
trains just outside Liverpool Street and Edgware Road stations, and on another 
travelling between King’s Cross and Russell Square. The final explosion was 
around an hour later on a double-decker bus in Tavistock Square, not far from 
King’s Cross” (BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/).
7. We want to thank anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on a previous 
draft of this article.
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